We study the pricing and tipping behaviour in the online service 'Google Answers'. While users set a price for the answer to their question ex ante, they can additionally give a tip to the researcher ex post. The obtained data set is analysed and compared to the results of similar games conducted in the laboratory, namely Fehr, Gächter and Kirchsteiger (1997) and Gächter and Falk (2002) . Reciprocal theories of social preferences pioneered by Rabin (1993) and extended by Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) are useful to explain the observed pattern of behaviour.
In line with the related experimental literature we conclude that an open contracts design encourages people to tip. We …nd evidence that this is motivated by reciprocity, but also by reputation concerns among frequent users. Moreover, researchers seem to adjust their e¤ort based on the user's previous tipping behaviour. An e¢ cient sorting takes place when a su¢ cient tip history is available. Users known for tipping in the past receive higher e¤ort answers, while users with an established "bad" reputation for tipping tend to get low e¤ort answers.
Introduction
While other-regarding behaviour of individuals has been found in numerous lab experiments, it is not too clear yet what the precise drivers of socially-minded behaviour are and whether they also pertain in real-life environments.
The experimental evidence of individuals who consistently make voluntary payments has been explained by theories that take the psychological underpinnings of economic behaviour better into account, namely social preferences. 2 However, the external validity of the lab results is far less studied and merits more attention. Can we observe the behaviour found in the lab as well in reallife contexts and what are the underlying motivations of the occurring voluntary payments?
We collected …eld data about the pricing and tipping behaviour of "Google Answers"users in order to shed more light on these aspects. In this online service (a sub-service of Google) users can post questions and set a …xed price for the answer. They can also give a tip to the researcher who answered the question. Our new data set contains 6,853 observations (collected between July 2003 and January 2004) with a number of additional explanatory variables thanks to the online availability of past questions of the service. The service started in April 2002 and the average price for one answer is about $20. This rich data set puts us in a position to test the relevance of social preferences in a real-life environment instead of observing behaviour through the lab microscope.
The goal of the paper is to analyse the pricing and tipping behaviour in this non-laboratory test-bed in order to validate the results of related lab experiments. In particular we focus on (i) the underlying cause for the voluntary payments and (ii) the e¤ects of such a design on e¤ort levels and e¢ ciency. We present three possible motivations for the tipping of users and we will test empirically to what extent they drive the behaviour of Google Answers users. First, the tipping could be to conform to a social norm as it is the case in restaurants, for instance. Social preferences could motivate users to leave a tip. Finally, users may decide to tip out of strategic considerations, e.g. reputation.
Social dilemma situations have been analysed in numerous experiments. The Google Answers environment is very similar to the particular setting of Fehr, Gächter and Kirchsteiger (1997) . They study labour relations between …rms and workers. When mutual opportunities to reciprocate are given (…rms can reward or punish the worker ex post), higher e¤ort levels than under stricter contract options are reached. They also …nd a signi…cant positive correlation between workers'e¤ort and the …rms'reaction (reward or punishment). Based on Rabin (1993) they explain the observed behaviour with reciprocity concerns. We follow this approach also taking into account the theory of sequential reciprocity of Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) . Besides reciprocity frequent users may also be motivated by reputation to leave a tip in Google Answers. Experiments about interaction e¤ects between reciprocity and reputation have been conducted in Gächter and Falk (2002) and we refer to them in our analysis.
Our real-life …ndings largely con…rm the results of these experiments. About 25% of all answers have been tipped and the three main results of our empirical analysis follow. The more questions users ask over time the more likely they are to tip. Moreover, even single users tip. Around 18% of these observations are tipped. This is a lower rate than for frequent users, but it is still signi…cant. Finally, tipping seems to pay o¤. Our data con…rms that researchers take the past tipping behaviour of users into account and put more e¤ort into the answer, if the user has frequently tipped before. The higher e¤ort increases the bene…t of the user and the researcher gets fairly compensated for the extra e¤ort.
In the following section we describe the pitch of our …eld study -the online service Google Answers. Section 3 presents the related experimental and theoretical literature. Section 4 describes our data set, while section 5 analyses it. The conclusions are in section 6.
The Online Service Google Answers
Google is the most popular search engine and an essential tool to …nd information online. However, Google o¤ers more than its standard search tool as sometimes even experienced Internet users need help …nding exactly the answer they want to a question. 3 The service Google Answers (www.answers.google.com) provides help to these Internet users. It o¤ers assistance from researchers with expertise in online searching.
Google Answers users ask questions and Google Answers researchers try to answer them in return for a …xed price and a possible tip. After registering with the service users can post a question to Google Answers and specify how much they are willing to pay for an answer. Users can price their question anywhere between $2 and $200. In addition a non-refundable listing fee of $0.50 applies for each question. There is a pool of roughly 400 Google Answers researchers who have the possibility to answer. Once one of them decides to search for an answer, a question will get 'locked' (for 4 hours if the price is below $100, for 8 hours if above). This means a question is actively worked on by a researcher and no other researcher can answer it in that time. The researcher will try to obtain the requested information and will post his answer back to the service. Users are only charged for their question when an answer is given. If the answer received is not satisfying, the user can …rst ask for additional research through an "answer clari…cation" request. If still unsatis…ed, users can request to have the question reposted for a new answer or apply for a refund. 4 When the answer is completed, they can also rate the quality of the answer. The average rating of a researcher is easily accessible and has an e¤ect on the standing of the researcher towards users and their employer Google. Finally, users can give a tip to the researcher who answered. The tip goes fully to the researcher in contrast to the price of a question where Google takes a 25% cut. If answering the question is not attractive to any researcher out of the pool, it will expire after 30 days.
According to Google all researchers are tested to make sure that they are expert searchers with excellent communication skills. Some of them also have expertise in a particular …eld. Additionally, answers are edited by Google to ensure quality. Researchers are independent contractors and for only a few of them Google Answers is the main job.
Any question that can be answered with words or numbers can get posted. Many users are looking for a speci…c piece of information like "How much tea was sold in China last year?", "In which San Francisco club did I see the Chemical Brothers play in 1995/96?" or "Race results from Belmont Park 5/24/1990. Who won the 8th & 9th race? And the daily double?". If the answer to the request is online, chances are pretty good that it will be found by the researchers. Moreover, complex questions are posted where background information is demanded and further links are expected. Examples are "How to get information about life in London during the late 1970's: …lms, television, plays, home decor, music, restaurants, political events, etc." or "Mutual perceptions of Europe and Asia via portraits". Also a number of questions are about marketing or business strategies. Questions are grouped into several categories as explained later.
Naturally, detailed questions regarding …nancial, medical or legal advice are excluded from Google Answers as is anything related to illegal activities.
Related Literature
A great number of experiments studies behaviour in social dilemma games. We particularly refer to Fehr, Gächter and Kirchsteiger (1997), henceforth FGK, and Gächter and Falk (2002) .
FGK analyse a simple labour market with …rms, workers and excess supply of workers. Three di¤erent contracts are simulated in experiments. While contract terms were exogenously enforced in the …rst treatment, workers were able to reciprocate in the second and both …rms and workers were able to reciprocate in the third treatment. E¤ort levels of workers were signi…cantly higher in the last (strong reciprocity) treatment and a contract that gives the opportunity for mutual reciprocity was found to improve e¢ ciency.
Gächter and Falk (2002) study the interaction e¤ects of reciprocity and repeated game incentives. A gift-exchange game between …rms and workers was played in a one-shot and a repeated game treatment. Correlation between wage and e¤ort in both treatments con…rms reciprocal motivations. Higher e¤ort levels in the repeated game treatment con…rm the positive impact of reciprocal concerns.
Reciprocity
The set up in FGK consists of two stages -a third one is added in their strong reciprocity treatment. First, …rms announce the details of their contract (wage, desired e¤ort, the possible …ne for shirking). Then, workers choose an o¤er they like and their e¤ort level. Shirking, e.g. low e¤ort levels, is veri…able only by chance. Firms'pro…ts depend on the e¤ort. In the …nal stage …rms can reward or punish their workers. Equilibrium e¤ort levels are determined by the o¤ered wage and the amount and likelihood of the …ne. If …rms and workers are purely sel…sh, the third stage will not have any impact on equilibrium behaviour as it is costly for …rms to reward or punish. Still, FGK found that …rms often reciprocated. There was also a signi…cant correlation between workers' e¤ort and the …rms' reaction (reward or punishment). E¤ort levels and pro…ts for workers and …rms were higher when …rms had the opportunity to reward or punish.
The strategic structure of the Google Answers environment is very similar. Users post a question and set a price. Researchers "compete" for the right to answer. One researcher answers the question and posts it back. The quality of the answer depends on the e¤ort of the researcher, which is not veri…able. The user's value of the labour relation depends on the researcher's e¤ort and is therefore subject to moral hazard. Users can reject answers based on their quality. A rejection and a subsequent refund can be seen as a …ne for the researcher, because such an incident a¤ects the researcher's standing within Google Answers.
FGK explain the observed behaviour in their experiments by taking reciprocity motives into account. They relate to the seminal work of Rabin (1993) . In addition we consider Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) as their theory of sequential reciprocity is better suited for the sequential character of Google Answers. It is important to stress that this approach does not neglect the assumption that individuals maximise their utility. It merely allows their utility to re ‡ect social concerns as well. Besides their own payo¤ it matters to them as well what the payo¤s and intentions of other individuals are. For the relationship between users and researchers in the context of Google Answers concerns for reciprocity seem to play a signi…cant role and we adopt this approach. The following section outlines how the sequential reciprocity equilibrium is determined.
The utility function of socially-minded individuals increases not only in their material payo¤s but also in the psychological payo¤s which depend on the individuals' kindness to others and beliefs about that. The resulting games are solved using the psychological games framework of Geanakoplos, Pearce and Stacchetti (1989) . While the action set a i describes the choices of player i (e.g. the e¤ort of the researcher or the chosen price and tip of the user), b ij de…nes the belief of i about the choices of player j; whereas e b iji is i's belief about what j believes are i's choices. This framework of beliefs allows us to express the kindness and beliefs about the kindness of individuals towards another individual. This is done by comparing an actual payo¤ to the equitable or fair payo¤ of a player, e . The equitable payo¤ of an individual is the average of his best and worst outcome based on the choices of the other individual. 5 For agent j it is given by:
It can be seen as a reference point for how kind i is to j as this kindness ij is expressed by relating the actual payo¤ j is given by i to the equitable payo¤ of j:
Similarly i's belief about the kindness of j to i is:
Incorporating kindness and the beliefs about it gives the following utility function with a material payo¤ as the …rst term and the reciprocity payo¤ in the second term that is weighted by the reciprocity sensitivity ( = 0 is the special case of pure self-interest).
The condition to solve the game is that in equilibrium all beliefs and second order beliefs are correct. It is also important to mention that beliefs of players are updated over the course of the game. The individuals apply Bayesian updating.
A positive reciprocity equilibrium exists. The user will give a tip, if his sensitivity to reciprocity is large enough: u > u . The possibility of u < u corresponds to the nasty equilibrium.
After establishing conditions for the user to give a tip once the researcher has put in high e¤ort, it has to be analysed whether the researcher will ever work at a high e¤ort level in the …rst place. He knows that the user will never give a tip when u < u and therefore he will never give high e¤ort. This constitutes the sequential reciprocity equilibrium of (low e¤ort, (no tip, no tip)).
The researcher also knows that the user will act reciprocally once her sensitivity to reciprocity u is large enough. That means he assumes the user will reward the choice of high e¤ort with a tip and will reply to low e¤ort by not giving a tip. It can be shown that the condition for the researcher to make the high e¤ort decision is always ful…lled and the sequential reciprocity equilibrium of (high e¤ort, (tip, no tip)) results. 6 By applying sequential reciprocity theory we can explain when users give a tip. Social preferences are necessary which are incorporated into the utility function with a reciprocity payo¤. Once reciprocity gains (from returning kind behaviour) outweigh the material loss of paying a tip, users will prefer to tip. However, users and researchers have to be su¢ ciently motivated by reciprocity, e.g. -their sensitivity to reciprocity -has to be large enough. Moreover, the researcher has to believe that the user's is large enough in order to provide high e¤ort in the …rst place.
Repeated Interaction
Google Answers users have a unique ID which makes them recognisable to researchers. The previous tipping behaviour of users can be observed by researchers and they may also be able to evaluate whether the e¤ort of the respective researcher justi…ed giving a tip. The relationship between reciprocity and reputation concerns in such a repeated games environment has been the topic of Gächter and Falk (2002) . They aim to separate between non-strategic (reciprocity) and strategic (reputation) motives in their experimental set up of a gift-exchange game. In a one-shot treatment …rms and workers were anonymously matched for 10 periods knowing that they couldn't face the same partner twice, in the repeated game treatment 10 periods were played with a known partner. While the authors do observe reciprocal behaviour in both treatments, the wage-e¤ort relationship is steeper in the repeated game treatment and e¤ort levels are signi…cantly higher in the repeated game treatment (until the last period) than in the one-shot treatment. Moreover, they identify reciprocal, sel…sh and imitating types among workers.
A possible explanation for the multiple equilibria in repeated games is described by the folk theorem. Since future interactions are taken into account, even purely self-interested individuals would tip, if they discount the future not too much. In that sense tipping is pro…table if and only if the increase in future payo¤s outweighs the cost of tipping now. Essentially, leaving a tip has to generate enough good reputation that su¢ ciently many questions in the future are answered with high e¤ort. When the user expects to ask questions frequently in the future, she will bene…t often from high e¤ort answers. Then tipping makes sense as long as she does not discount these future pro…ts too much.
Alternatively, repeated interaction can be interpreted as a reputation mechanism where an updating process about a players' "type" takes place. When the decision to cooperate depends on the type of a player, e.g. good or bad, Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts and Wilson (1982) for instance show that cooperative equilibria can be reached. This kind of reputation model is based on Bayesian updating of beliefs and in the context of Google Answers it means that researchers update their beliefs about the tipping behaviour of the user they face. We can distinguish two di¤erent types, socially-minded and sel…sh users.
When there is no tip history available, researchers have an uninformed belief 0 regarding the chance a speci…c user will leave a tip. Researchers who know the past tipping behaviour of their user will take this into account when they make their e¤ort decision. Their updated belief n replaces the uninformed belief 0 . When researchers observe that a user has a positive tip history, they will update their belief of the probability this user is of the "tipping" type accordingly. Given su¢ cient observations (past answers) the updated belief tends to converge to 0 for sel…sh users who do not tip and to 1 for users who do tip high e¤ort answers.
Hence, the Bayesian updating of users' past tipping behaviour reduces the uncertainty the researchers face. The more they are able to inform themselves about the user's past behaviour, the better they are able to identify the user's type. They will have a better idea whether or not to expect a tip and will put in high e¤ort when it is likely to be rewarded. They will put in standard e¤ort, if chances for receiving a tip from the user they face are too low. Sociallyminded users reciprocate and tip high e¤ort answers, while sel…sh users do not tip. However, sel…sh frequent users may also take the researchers' updating into account and they might decide to imitate the "socially-minded" type. By tipping high quality answers they build up a good reputation and encourage high e¤ort answers in the future.
Social preferences among researchers would reinforce these strategic considerations. Researchers are able to observe the previous tipping behaviour of users and they may also be able to evaluate, whether a tip was not given due to low effort. As explained before that means researchers will update their beliefs about the tipping behaviour of the user they face. They would take the kindness of 'their'user towards other researchers into account, if they are also motivated by indirect reciprocity. 7 Then the researcher's belief about the kindness of the user is updated based on the user's previous actions and the researcher will put in high e¤ort, if the user has a good enough track record of tipping and rewarding high e¤ort answers.
Summary
The section presented the results of two experimental studies and showed their similaritites to the Google Answers environment. In line with FGK we relate our analysis to sequential reciprocity theory and study whether reciprocity explains the voluntary payments. Google Answers users may use the service repeatedly. These users may anticipate the bene…ts from establishing a good reputation and the resulting high quality answers in the future. Therefore, reputation concerns may motivate kind behaviour (e.g. tipping) besides reciprocity. Similar to Gächter and Falk (2002) we analyse the impact of such repeated interaction on the voluntary payments.
Like FGK we test whether an open contracts design -providing mutual opportunities to reciprocate -produces voluntary payments, e.g. tips, by single users and whether these tips are motivated by reciprocity, i.e. a higher e¤ort level of the researcher.
Hypothesis 1:
The average tip of single users is signi…cantly greater than 0.
There is also a causal relationship between e¤ort and tip.
Turning to repeated interaction two rationales (folk theorem, type updating) can explain the tipping of sel…sh frequent users. Hence, tipping out of strategic considerations hinges on the frequency of use and the belief updating of researchers.
Hypothesis 2: Frequent users tend to tip at least as often as single users.
Like Gächter and Falk (2002) we distinguish between socially-minded and sel…sh types of users. Since there is no end-period e¤ect in the …eld data, we cannot separate imitators from truly reciprocal users like they did. In order to con…rm this classi…cation, users who tip must have had a tendency to tip in the past, likewise users who do not tip must have had a tendency not to tip in the past. Hence, users are of a certain type and stick to their strategy or preference, respectively.
Hypothesis 3: Tips are not distributed equally across users. The previous behavioural pattern is followed and the types "tipping" and "non-tipping" can be distinguished.
When di¤erent tipping types exist, researchers may inform themselves about a user's tip history and update their belief about the probability with which a user might tip. That a¤ects their e¤ort decision.
Hypothesis 4: After enough observations to establish a reputation the questions of users with a good tip history are answered with higher e¤ort, questions of users with a "bad" reputation for tipping are answered with lower e¤ort. Tip history and e¤ort are positively correlated.
Finally, we test, whether an open contracts design has a similarly positive e¤ect on e¢ ciency in Google Answers as in FGK.
Hypothesis 5: After su¢ cient observations to reveal the behaviour of users, e¢ ciency increases as researchers put in more e¤ort (which means more value to users) and they get rewarded with a tip.
Description of the Data Set
Answers and comments to questions on Google Answers are not kept private to the user who posted the question. Instead, they are explicitly intended for the public by Google. Thus, everybody interested can bene…t from the answers found. Past questions with the entire thread of comments, answers and answer clari…cations plus information about their price, tip, rating and category are archived online. This gave us the opportunity to collect a large amount of detailed data. While we believe our data set contains all questions asked within the observation interval (question ID 230,000 to 300,000), we cannot guarantee the completeness of the set. The failure of an observation getting extracted would however be random and would therefore not a¤ect our sample. Our data set starts in July 2003 and ends in January 2004. Within this period we collected 13,948 questions and 6,853 of these were answered. The rest expired 30 days after the question was posted. Thus, total observations for our analysis amount to 6,853. 8 The number of answered questions over time is very stable. The range for the …ve full months of observation (August to December) is between 1,027 and 1,182. Overall, 1,745 answers have been tipped, which is a ratio of slightly more than a quarter.
The observations of our data set are generated by 4,840 di¤erent users. The highest number of observations posted by the same user is 77. Still, the majority of users just asked a single question. The median of the distribution is therefore 1 and the average number of questions per user is 1.42.
We collected the following data for each answer: The user ID of the person who posted the question, the price he set, the tip he possibly gave, the ID of the researcher who answered, date and time of posting the question, date and time of posting the answer, the rating of the researcher that was possibly left, the category of the question, the word count of the answer and the word count of the possible answer clari…cation.
Out of this data we computed additional variables. We calculated the time it took to answer a question (the di¤erence between when the question was answered and when it was posted) and the frequency of use of the service (the number of questions posted (answered or not) by each user during the observation period). We expressed the e¤ort of the researcher in two ways. We relate (i) the word count of the answer as well as (ii) the time it took to answer to the price. Moreover, we created a dummy if there was an answer clari…cation and various category dummies as explained later. The range of prices is pre-determined by Google Answers. The lowest price users can set is $2 and the highest price possible is $200. These are also minimum and maximum price of the sample. The average price conditional on the question being answered (6,853 observations) is $21.59, while the average price of the 7,095 questions that expired without an answer is lower. It is only $19.23. Median and mode of the price distribution are $10. 8 Since the focus of our analysis is the tipping aspect we decided to deliberately truncate the data set considering only answered questions as observations. We are aware of the fact that a more general model would analyse all questions and why some are not answered. We only touch this issue in our paper.
Minimum and maximum values for the tip are also pre-set by the service. There is an upper limit of $100 for the tip. The mean of the distribution is $8.94 and its median and mode equal $5.
The time di¤erence between question and answer is expressed in days, so 1 equals one day and for instance the value 0.25 means it took 6 hours to answer. The quickest answer came after only two minutes, the slowest was given just before the 30 day expiration deadline. The median of the distribution is 0.2. That means half of all answers were posted within 5 hours.
The word count is the number of words of an answer. The shortest answer was a single word ("No" to be precise) and the longest contained 11,482 words (a $190 question with $65 tip).
A rating has been given for 4,359 answers, roughly two thirds of the total. The possible range is from 1 to 5, with 5 being the top rating. If users decided to give a rating, they did not mind giving the highest possible as median and mode are 5 and the average rating is 4.7.
The dummy variable answer clari…cation equals one if a clari…cation was given and zero otherwise. An answer clari…cation was requested and given in 29.34% of all times.
The variable 'e¤ort1'describes the word count-based e¤ort the researcher has put into an answer. It is the ratio of 'word count'over 'price'. The more words researchers have included in answers of equally priced questions, the higher their e¤ort has been. The average words per dollar are 59.32 and again median and mode are below the mean. The most words per dollar received have been 1,657.
The variable 'e¤ort2' describes the e¤ort of the researcher in terms of the time it took to answer. It is the ratio of 'price'over 'time di¤erence'. The quicker researchers have delivered answers of equally priced questions, the higher their e¤ort has been. Since our measure for time is the di¤erence between the posting of the question and the posting of the answer this variable has to be taken with some caution. The variable 'time di¤erence' might not always be the time a researcher has worked on a question. It is exactly that, if the researcher started to work right after the question has been posted and this is arguably the case for many questions. However, questions might remain in the pool of unanswered questions for a while before a researcher decides to work on the answer. This can be up to 30 days after the posting of the question. The 'time di¤erence'is then the time worked on the answer plus the time that passed until the researcher started working. Table 2 lists the ten di¤erent categories in which users can post their questions. We created dummies for all of them except the last one: 'Miscellaneous'. Their popularity is quite di¤erent. While only 216 observations are in category 'Sports and Recreation', the most popular category after 'Miscellaneous' was 'Computers' with 1,209 entries. About 31% of all observations in 'Arts & Entertainment' or 'Sports and Recreation' have been tipped. Users in the 'Business & Money'category appear to be the least generous as only 21.68% of these questions have been tipped. The tip rate of the other categories is fairly close to the overall average of 25.46%. The 'Business & Money' category also features the highest average price ($34.32). 
Analysis of the Data
The results of a panel regression of the data set are presented …rst, then we analyse some speci…c aspects in more detail. We focus on the possible motivations for tipping that have been identi…ed: conforming to a social norm, social preferences or strategic considerations due to reputation concerns. Finally, we analyse the relationship between updating, e¤ort decision and e¢ ciency in the data set.
Estimations
Three di¤erent arguments should explain the tipping behaviour in the data and we use a set of proxy variables to test them. Firstly, reputation may matter. Frequent users of the service have an incentive to build up a good reputation and may regard tipping as a strategic device. Secondly, social preferences would make people tip. Users who are socially-minded should leave a tip as long as there is a reason to reciprocate. Thirdly, the tip should simply be a¤ected by the price of the question. Users may tend to tip proportionally to the price, giving a high tip for a highly priced question and vice versa. Our proxy for reputation concerns is the frequency with which a user asked questions during the observation period. A high frequency of use means the user should put much weight on her future income and this is positively a¤ected by tipping now. The more questions posted the more generous users should be with the tip -simply out of strategic considerations. We use the logarithmic value of the frequency of use in our regression.
To take account of behaviour that elicits social preferences we use the following set of proxies. The e¤ort involved in a given answer shows how hard a researcher worked for the answer. Users su¢ ciently motivated by social preferences would then reciprocate and tip. Has a rating been left, a user seems to care about the bene…t of the researcher, although only non-monetarily. Moreover, if an answer clari…cation has been given, the researcher put in an extra e¤ort and this could once again trigger positive reciprocity. While we are aware that these variables can only be rather crude surrogates for what motivates voluntary giving, we believe that this quanti…cation can nevertheless contribute to a better understanding of social preferences.
E¤ort is metered in terms of time and word count relative to the price of the question. An answer of average quality that comes very fast might have a higher value for the user as will an answer that comes within the usual time but is very comprehensive with a lot more background information than expected. Therefore, a question that has been answered with relatively high e¤ort is more likely to generate value for the user. Users with social preferences would tend to return the kind behaviour of the researcher and give a tip, when their question has been answered with high e¤ort.
Once a user leaves a rating, it seems fair to assume that she is not entirely self-interested. It only costs time and a positive impact on a user's reputation seems hard to imagine. It shows on the other hand that the user cares about the researcher since researchers'ratings are fairly important to them. There is no monetary sharing of course, but leaving a rating can be seen as a sign for a minimum of social preferences, necessary for giving a tip.
An answer clari…cation is given only on request, after the answer itself has been posted. It is likely that the clari…cation adds more value to the answer, but it could also be argued that the researcher puts in some extra e¤ort and this should trigger reciprocal behaviour of the user. Hence, we use the answer clari…cation dummy as another proxy for social preferences.
The tip is the dependent variable in our regression and the equation we estimate is t = k + bX + where k is the constant, b is the vector of the coe¢ cients, X is the vector of our variables and is the error term. The explanatory variables are the price of the question, the frequency of use (logarithmic), the rating, e¤ort1 (word countbased), e¤ort2 (time-based), the answer clari…cation dummy and the dummies for the categories. Table 11 lists the variables, their coe¢ cients and respective standard errors for our estimations.
Since no negative tip can be given the distribution of the tip is left-censored at zero. It is also right-censored at 100 by design of the service. Therefore, a censored regression model appears appropriate for our data. The Tobit model takes limits of the range of the dependent variable into account to ensure unbiased and consistent estimates. The Tobit maximum likelihood estimates are shown in column I. These are the results of the standard Tobit model which assumes a single distribution function for the dependent variable. However, there is reason to believe that the decision on whether to tip or not and the decision how much to tip (given one has chosen to tip) are separated. Di¤erent distributions could be underlying. A two-equation model of Cragg (1971) will take this into account. Using a two-step approach we can split up the two decisions whether to tip and if so then how much to tip by using di¤erent probability functions in the Tobit model. (Amemiya 1984) A Probit model estimates the binary decision of whether to tip or not and a truncated regression is used to estimate the size of the tip. The results are given in columns II and III, respectively. We compare the …t of the restricted Tobit model and the unrestricted composite model of Probit and truncated regression to see if the two-equation approach should be considered. A likelihood ratio test of restricted against unrestricted model rejects the null hypothesis clearly. Separating the decisions and estimating a Probit model combined with a truncated regression is advisable. The price is highly signi…cant in all regressions. One argument for separating the tipping decision and the decision of how much to tip was that the price of the question might not a¤ect the …rst, but even more the second decision. In fact, it turns out that the price does a¤ect both decisions, but the decision whether to tip to a lesser extent. The data also con…rms the signi…cance of reputation concerns. The estimators for the coe¢ cient of the frequency of use are statistically signi…cant, yet again at a lower level (10%) in the Probit regression.
The e¤ect of the word count-based e¤ort is clearly positive as well. While the Probit estimator for 'e¤ort1' is very signi…cant, it is less signi…cant in the truncated regression. It seems high e¤ort only a¤ects the decision to leave a tip or not, it has a lesser impact on the size of the tip. The regression results for the time-based e¤ort give no indication that this variable is signi…cant. Either the described problems of computing the variable are too big or users do not actually care how fast they receive answers. The rating is one of the best variables to explain the tip. Its coe¢ cients are highly signi…cant throughout the regressions. It also clearly matters whether an answer clari…cation has been given. Again, the coe¢ cients are very signi…cant throughout.
Our dummy variables show, if there are di¤erent tipping patterns in the various categories. While the standard Tobit speci…cation of the model does not …nd signi…cance of a category dummy, we get some meaningful results in the two-equation approach. Dummies for the categories 'Arts & Entertainment' and 'Sports and Recreation'are signi…cant in Probit at the 5%-level. These are the categories with tip rates (31%) clearly above the average of 25%. However, their coe¢ cients are signi…cant and negative in the truncated regression. Users in this category tend to tip often, but their tips are very small. On the other hand, users in the category 'Health'seem to tip a lot, if they decide to at all.
It would be intuitive to include the tip history into the regression as well. A high tip history (e.g. …ve previous answers out of seven tipped) should indicate a higher chance of a tip given at the present answer than when the tip history is low (e.g. no previous answers tipped). In fact, the tip history is highly signi…cant, but it causes multicollinearity with the frequency of use and biases the regression. Therefore, it was not included. Regressions with the tip ratio as the left-hand side variable instead of the price on the right-hand side deliver largely similar results.
Our censored regression models are based on maximum likelihood and they assume a normal distribution of the error term and homoscedasticity. A BeraJarque test rejected the normality assumption. A censored least absolute deviations estimator o¤ers an alternative as it is robust to changes in the error distribution. Its estimators are consistent, but ine¢ cient. However, this could not be performed due to software limitations.
Nevertheless, all our estimation results con…rm the positive e¤ects of social preferences and reputation on the tip that theory and experiments suggest. The coe¢ cients of frequency of use, e¤ort1, rating and answer clari…cation all have the expected sign and they are signi…cant at least at the 5%-level. Moreover, the …t of the regressions are su¢ cient at 15%.
Social Norm
Tipping is widespread in many service professions. Azar (2004) and Lynn (2005) survey tipping behaviour in common service situations like a restaurant visit, for instance. While originally (16th and 17th century in Europe) people tipped out of gratitude for extra service, out of compassion or to encourage better service, it soon became a social norm. Nowadays people rather feel obliged to tip. They tip mostly in order to conform to the social norm or to avoid embarrassment. In many occasions tipping is very institutionalised and a quite precise fraction of the bill is to be tipped. In restaurants people would tip roundabout the same percentage of their respective bill. (Azar 2004) If a social norm similar to restaurant tipping is the motivation for the tipping in Google Answers, we should observe a similar pattern. Many users should tip and the size of their tip (a percentage of the price paid) should not vary too much. However, the data appears to suggest otherwise. About 25% of all answers have been tipped. In the majority of the cases people do not tip. Users do not seem to be motivated by a widely followed social norm. It could be argued that the online environment and the fact that there is no direct contact makes less people adhere to the norm of tipping, but that it is still the social obligation that drives them to leave a tip. The high variation of tips contradicts that. The mean of the ratio "tip to price" is 0.204, however the standard deviation is 1.271. Many users do not tip at all, but also quite a few users leave very high tips compared to the price of the question. We observe tips …fty times the price of the respective question. This does not …t the tipping pattern we know from restaurants. Hence, we conclude that it seems unlikely that Google Answers users tip due to a social norm.
Social Preferences
Reputation e¤ects may in ‡uence the tipping behaviour of users. We study the behaviour of single users only, in order to control for reputation and focus on social preferences.
Over the entire observation period 18% of all single users did tip. 9 Since our data set ends in January, we would treat users incorrectly as single users who joined shortly before the cut-o¤ line and continued asking questions afterwards. These users might tip out of reputation concerns, while we would consider them as single users. This may in deed be the case as the tip rate of single users over the observation months increases towards the end of the period. Table 4 shows the tip rate of (single) users and also the ratio of the single user tip rate to the tip rate of all users, since there is a slight upward trend of the tip rate over the months. The ratio is the lowest in October which means that we have the fewest tipping single users in this month. Single users in October are three months distant from having possibly posted a question before the observation period or posting another question in the future, yet more than 17% of them decided to tip their answer. Table 5 in the next subsection for the data about single users.
In the entire data set there are 2,942 single users and 529 of them did leave a tip. The mean of the distribution is 1.47 and the standard deviation is 5.79. The frequency of tips by single users is statistically signi…cant from zero at the 1% level. A separate regression only with single users delivers results similar to the main regression. The word count-based e¤ort is statistically signi…cant at the 5% level.
After controlling for the impact of reputation e¤ects we …nd that tips are still prevalent, albeit at a lower rate than among frequent users. Moreover, tips are explained by e¤ort. This con…rms hypothesis 1. Our approach to control for repeated game incentives is naturally limited by the …eld data set and cannot be regarded as bullet proof. Nevertheless, the results are in line with comparable experimental and …eld studies. Voluntary payments at a signi…cant level are also observed in another …eld study where reputation e¤ects cannot play a role. (Regner and Barria 2005) 
Reputation Concerns
Frequent users could have an interest in building up a reputation of appreciating good e¤ort and acknowledging it with a tip. This way they may attract workers who recognise them as generous and will deliver good quality. This motivation may be of particular relevance in online environments, since buyers and sellers do not see each other online.
In order to test the impact of reputation e¤ects on the tipping behaviour we split our sample into subgroups. We computed each user's frequency of use which is the number of questions posted during the observation period. Some users may not have a clear idea of how often they are going to use the service when they start with the …rst question, but on average they should be aware of that. Therefore, we believe the frequency of use is a good indicator to what extent users should be concerned about their reputation. Since our sample is taken out of an ongoing stream of questions, there is no last period or rather last observation. Hence, we will not be able to observe a last period e¤ect that may distinguish behaviour motivated by reputation from social preferences.
We clustered our observations into four subgroups according to the number of questions users asked over the entire period: single users, occasional users who asked two or three questions, frequent ones with four to nine questions asked and very frequent users who asked more than ten questions during the observation period. The following table shows the pricing and tipping behaviour of users in each subgroup. The clustering is based on the number of questions asked (13, 948) , while total observations is the number of questions answered (6, 853) as naturally only these can contain information about the answer given. The column 'users'gives the number of users within each group.
The largest group of our sample are single users. Almost 18% of them gave a tip, which is far below the total sample average of 25%. However, with increasing number of questions asked we can observe a steadily increasing tip rate. Already about 26% of the observations by users who asked two or three questions were tipped. The tip rate goes up to more than 33% for the subgroup of users that asked four to nine questions and basically stays at that level for the group of very frequent users.
These results lead us to conclude that occasional users already take reputation concerns into account. For frequent and very frequent users reputation concerns matter even more as the tip rate increases further. However, there seems to be a satiation e¤ect as the rates for the last two subgroups are virtually the same.
Frequent users tip consistently more often than single users, similar to the experimental …ndings of Gächter and Falk (2002) . In fact, the tip rate increases with the frequency of use, which con…rms hypothesis 2.
Updating, e¤ort decision and e¢ ciency
This section tries to shed more light on the decision making of researchers. They may update their beliefs about the likeliness the user they face will tip (if e¤ort is high). In the data set we can specify the tip history of each user at each number of question she posted. It is the amount of answers she tipped divided by the total of answers she received at that point. Recall that this information is not very straightforward to get for the researchers. It is not shown next to the user name as the past average like the rating of researchers is for instance. 10 Table 6 splits the sample into di¤erent sub groups with respect to the question number asked. Essentially we see that the tip rate increases for users who keep on asking questions which is not surprising as we know that frequent user tend to tip more often. When we consider the respective tip history of each user at each question number we …nd that there is a large split between tipped and untipped questions. Naturally, the tip history is 0 at question number 1. In the intermediate range of question numbers users who did not tip had an average tip history of just 1 0 Or the seller's reputation on eBay.
19%, while users who left a tip had one of 61%. We can observe a very similar split in the high range of question numbers as shown in Table 7 .
Users who tip an answer clearly had a tendency to do so in the past as well. On the other hand, users who did not give a tip have a rather low tip history. Users appear to have preferences or a strategy to tip (high quality answers) and they stick to it, which con…rms hypothesis 3. If researchers do in fact update their beliefs about the chances to get a tip for high e¤ort work, then they should anticipate that and make their e¤ort decision based on this belief. They should put in low e¤ort when they face a user with a poor tip history and they should exert high e¤ort when they meet a user who has tipped in the past. Table 8 relates the question number to the e¤ort of the researcher (the word count-based 'e¤ort1'). When a user asks the …rst question no tip history exists and the e¤ort decision cannot be based on the user's past. Comparing questions with and without tip shows that e¤ort is slightly higher for the tipped ones. This is just what we should expect since we know that e¤ort explains the tip. We have already seen that users tend to stick to their tipping pattern.
The tip history appears to be a good indicator of the user's type/strategy. Researchers can update their beliefs about the user's tendency to tip, once previous questions are available. They can make an educated e¤ort decision as the updating tells them whether the user is likely to reward high e¤ort with a tip or not. While the split between questions with and without tip is similar in the intermediate range of question numbers (Mann-Whitney test between tipped and untipped samples, 5% signi…cance level), the gap clearly widens in the high range. With ten or more questions of tip history available the tipped questions have been worked on with signi…cantly more e¤ort than questions without tip (Mann-Whitney test, 1% signi…cance level). The average e¤ort is also higher compared to earlier questions that were tipped (Mann-Whitney test between tipped samples of occasional and frequent users, 1% signi…cance level). It seems that in deed researchers update their beliefs based on the tip history and that they make their e¤ort decision according to that belief. Moreover, users stick to their behaviour type/strategy and they reward high e¤ort, if they are su¢ ciently motivated by reciprocity or reputation. E¤ort and tip history are correlated in the frequent user sample (Spearman correlation coe¢ cient, 5% signi…cance level). This con…rms the fourth hypothesis.
Finally, the question is whether something can be said about the e¢ ciency of this open contracts design and the fact that it provides opportunities to reciprocate for users and researchers. Does it pay o¤ for researchers to put in high e¤ort, when they work on questions of users who are known for tipping? We can express the rent of researchers in dollars received per 100 words. It equals price plus tip divided by word count and multiplied by 100. We have seen that researchers work harder when the available tip history of a user is promising. The uncertainty regarding a possible tip is reduced. Now we see that they do get rewarded for that extra e¤ort. The rents for researchers when tips are given are consistently higher than when no tips are given (MannWhitney test between samples without and with tip, 1% signi…cance level for single and occasional users, no signi…cance for frequent users). Users known for tipping get higher e¤ort answers than new users, but they also reciprocate and apparently let the researchers participate in the gain from a high quality answers by returning some of the surplus and leaving a high tip.
However, once there is a substantial tip history available the researcher's e¤ort for untipped answers drops down so much (see Table 8 ) that their rent reaches the level of tipped answers (around $7 per 100 words). It appears they adjusted their e¤ort decision since their updating tells them a tip is very unlikely. Then researchers do as well as when they put in high e¤ort and get a tip (Mann-Whitney test between tipped and untipped samples, no signi…cant di¤erence).
The open contract design increases the e¤ort level and the e¢ ciency. It seems that it encourages socially-minded users to reciprocate (tipping high e¤ort answers) and that it makes self-interested users consider building up a good reputation (in order to motivate future high e¤ort answers). Through belief updating the researchers are able to match their e¤ort decision better to the user types. Consistent high e¤ort answers are possible in contrast to a more complete contract that does not allow a tip. Such a strict contract type is simulated, when users reveal that they are not going to tip (long enough low tip history). Then researchers update their beliefs accordingly and put in relatively low e¤ort, which results in less quality. Hence, we can con…rm hypothesis 5.
Conclusions
We collected a rich data set of Google Answers questions to investigate the reallife pricing and tipping behaviour of individuals. The motivation for the paper was to use this data set to check the external validity of experimental studies of social dilemma games. In particular, we were interested in the underlying motivations for the occurring voluntary payments and the e¢ ciency of such an open contracts design.
Our empirical analysis shows that the tip can be explained by social preferences proxies (e¤ort, rating and answer clari…cation) and reputation proxies (frequency of use). In addition to the regression analysis we found evidence for social preferences, once we controlled for reputation concerns by focusing on single users. Moreover, we were able to separate the reputation concerns within the data and found further evidence for strategic considerations among users. The higher tip rates of frequent users are in line with the experimental …ndings of Gächter and Falk (2002) . The e¤ect of reciprocal behaviour and repeated game incentives appear to be complementary. The data from Google Answers also con…rms the positive e¤ects of an open contracts scheme on the e¤ort level as found in Fehr, Gächter and Kirchsteiger (1997) .
We relate the …ndings to the theory of sequential reciprocity of Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) . Tipping takes place even among single users, if they are su¢ ciently sensitive to reciprocity. Frequent users may have an incentive to imitate this socially-minded behaviour. They tip in order to create a reputation of rewarding high e¤ort of researchers, thus attracting high e¤ort answers in future transactions. Once researchers realise this through updating of their beliefs about the user's type, they will put in high e¤ort in anticipation of a tip. The uncertainty about whether a user will tip is reduced when a su¢ cient tip history is available and researchers can update their beliefs reliably. They can make an educated e¤ort decision. High e¤ort is matched to rewarding users, low e¤ort is matched to users who do not tip. The open contract design can be seen as a virtuous circle that increases e¢ ciency.
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